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Administrative Justice and the Supremacy of Law in the United States.
By John Dickinson. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1927. pp.
xiii, 403. Harvard Studies in Administrative Law, Vol. I.
This is an effort to analyze the- problems of administrative justice-to
examine from a central point of view "the boundary between the province
of administrative adjudication and the courts." The author finds that the
chief problem of judicial review of administrative proceedings is that as
to how far the review shall extend, and that this rests to a great extent
upon the distinctions which the courts draw between "questions of law"
and "questions of fact." He largely disarms criticism by saying that the
time is ripe "for a comprehensive treatise on judicial review of administra-
tive determinations" and that his volume "makes no pretension to fill the
place of such a treatise." The author's problem is essentially one as to the
respective merits of judicial justice and administrative justice, and as to
the extent to which it is necessary or desirable that judicial justice have a
final check on the results of administrative justice.
That Professor Dickinson has not fully succeeded in analyzing the prob-
lems of administrative law is in part due, not so much to himself, as to
the need for thorough and detailed investigation into the actual operation
of present rules. The volume deserves praise as the first systematic
effort to discuss general principles since the studies of Goodnow and Wyman,
but in reading it, the reviewer had a somewhat confused impression and
felt the need for a compass. The impression of absence of unity of con-
struction is strengthened by a final chapter (xii) devoted to the problem
of legal education. At the point where the reader expects and needs guid-
ance to some final goal, he is shifted in chapter xii to a new and broader
subject whose bearing upon the specific topics under discussion is no
closer than to other fields of law.
The author's preface gives a clue to unity of subject-matter but only a
clue, and chapter xi on "review of administrative determinations of fact,"
does not draw the reader's attention to any final conclusion, though in this
chapter the author seeks to distinguish the judicial function from that of
administration and to limit the court's review to the determination or
application of some clearly formulated general rule of law, leaving to the
administrative authorities finality in the detailed application of the rule
so long as the court cannot rationally infer that their actions fall without
the rule (pp. 314-15, 318). With respect to public utility regulation the
distinction is more explicitly expressed on page 168:-
"Where the only ground which a court can give for its difference from
the administrative body is limited to mere difference of opinion as to some
matter or matters peculiar to the case, or some difference in inference from
those matters, then the court should not disturb the opinion or inference of
the fact-finding body unless the latter is plainly beyond the bounds of
reason; for the difference is one of discretion, or 'fact.' On the other hand,
where the ground of difference between court and fact-finding body can be
isolated and expressed as a general proposition applicable beyond the par-
ticular case to all similar cases, the court, if it holds the proposition one of
sound law, must enforce it by overruling the administrative determination.
This would apparently deny judicial review in such cases as MeCardlo
v. Indianapolis Water Co.,' unless the court could say (as it would if
'272 U. S. 400, 47 Sup. Ct. 144 (1926).
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it adopted the author's language) that the fact-finding body had
acted beyond the bounds of reason. The author himself recog-
nizes that an administrative determination "which could not rationally
have been reached by fair-2ninded men from the evidence" may properly
be set aside by the courts (p. 320). The author's rule apparently becomes a
theory of judicial discretion as to specific cases, though this is what he is
combatting, yet his views would apply the theory liberally, as has the
United States Supreme Court in dealing with the Interstate Commerce
Commission. In distinguishing "law" from "fact" the problem is practical
rather than logical, and in its discussion the author would have found much
of interest in the statutes and cases involving the extent of review by ap-
pellate courts. The thing to which the author particularly objects is the
failure of the court to lay down general principles, and the use of its
power "to revise at will the discretion of the administrative officials from
case to case" (p. 227). In this connection it would have been of interest to
discuss the extent to which in recognized fields of judicial authority courts
decide on the basis of the facts of particular cases, without laying down
general principles. In constitutional law, decisions on the validity of stat-
utes as tested by "due process" are often of this character, as are state
constitutional decisions as to what constitutes "one subject" of legislation.
Fact-decisions, as distinguished from decisions on principle, are character-
istic of the field of state regulation and state taxation of interstate com-
merce. It is impossible to draw a hard and fast line between law and fact.
The courts must deal equally as much with questions of degree as with
questions of principle, and questions of degree are largely questions of fact.
Cases decided merely on issues of fact, without giving any guidance for
the future, are irritating, but in administrative law and elsewhere they
will to some extent persist as long as law is a human institution.
By "supremacy of law" the author means supremacy of judicially-admin-
istered law. The distinction is not nearly so clear as he believes between
judicially administered law and that administered through the administra-
tive agencies of government. There are many instances in which an ad-
ministrative tribunal is not both an adjudicating and enforcing agency,
with the function of enforcement the dominant one (p. 204, 235). And
in the modern development, the statement that "administrative tribunals
decide controversies coming before them, not by fixed rules of law, but by
the application of governmental discretion or policy" (p. 36), is clearly not
applicable to a broad field of administrative determination. The move-
ment away from arbitrary discretion has been one of the most important
of recent years. This movement, while largely forced by judicial decisions,
has been to a great extent promoted by statutes to which the author gives
little attention. Nor does the author give sufficient attention to the grant
by statute of judicial review over administrative action in many cases
where judicial review would otherwise not be available.
On the whole the book seeks to make too sharp a logical distinction be-
tween judicial and administrative processes. In this connection it would
be of value to discover the extent to which judicial processes have tended
to become more summary, and administrative processes more regardful of
private interests. Development in administrative law for the safeguarding
of private rights seems now most likely to come through the establishment
of safeguards by statutes, and through an expansion of governmental re-
sponsibility for wrongful acts. In good part because of the logical anti-
thesis which the author has set up between "administrative justice" on the
one hand and "supremacy of law" on the other, these developments have
been ignored, although chapter v of the volume appears to recognize that
no such antithesis exists.
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The present volume is best in its specific discussions of the actual extent
of court review (c. vI-x), although even here theoretical digressions
somewhat confuse the issues. The specific topics are treated briefly, and
the treatment is for this reason often inadequate. Pages 265-268 do not
present a sufficient discussion of removals from public office. The subject
of public utility regulation is the most fully treated, and the discussion is
valuable. Yet here the reader must be guarded against being misled by
the intimation that writ of error is the only means of going from the
highest state court to the Supreme Court of the United States (p. 177).
And in discussing the scope of review by federal courts over the determi-
nations of state utility commissions, it must be remembered that proceed-
ings in the inferior federal courts under section 266 of the Federal Judi-
cial Code tend to be substituted in important cases for the procedure in
state courts provided by state statute.
The author as a rule writes clearly, though the organization of chapters
and the tendency to recur to the same topic cause the reader some diffi-
culty. Occasionally this difficulty is increased by resort to figures of speech,
which sometimes themselves become mixed, as on page 77, where the author
refers to the "dead hand" of an "obscure nerve of slumbering tradition."
The volume as a whole is a daring effort at generalization in a field where
fully successful generalization is not now attainable. Yet the effort was
worth while, and the volume contains much of value.
WALTEn F. DODD.
A Selection of Cases on the Conflict of Laws. By Joseph Henry Beale, Jr.
Second Edition. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1927, Vol. 1, pp.
xvii, 799. Vol. 2, pp. 891.
Professor Beale's casebook on the Conflict of Laws, which appeared in
three volumes from 1900 to 1902, was a remarkable piece of work. Although
the cases involving the conflict of laws were not to be readily found in the
Anglo-American reports, there were brought together in this collection all
the leading English and American cases on this subject. According to
Professor Beale, the "common law" has accepted, as the basis of the con-
flict of laws, the theory of vested rights. A state is deemed to possess ex-
clusive power, in consequence of the principle of territoriality, to attach
legal consequences to certain operative facts either because they took place
within its territory, or because they are deemed connected with such terri-
tory. Thus, the state where a contract is made or a tort is committed has
the sole power to say whether an obligation has been created. If it has
created such obligation, all other states must recognize it as a fact, although
they need not give it effect. Property rights can be created only by the
state in which the physical res is located, and "status" rights, by the state
in which the party whose status is in question is domiciled. In accordance
with this fundamental point of view, the first volume of Professor Bealo's
first edition dealt principally with the subject of "Jurisdiction," the second
dealt with the "Creation of Rights" and the third, with the "Recognition
and Enforcement of Rights." Professor Beale was aware, of course, that
the decisions of the Anglo-American courts did not present a very homo-
geneous picture in the matter of the conflict of laws, but he felt that he
could promote the scientific development of law best by throwing the weight
of his great authority in support of the theory which he believed would
produce greater simplicity and uniformity. In his preface to the present
edition of his casebook, Professor Beale states that he had postponed the
preparation of a new edition until the subject became more stabilized, but
that he had lived to despair of this consummation. Professor Beale's
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strong convictions concerning the fundamental principles which should
govern the conflict of laws and his conception of law in general have
caused him to find in the decided eases general rules, instead of decisions
of particular controversies. In his opinion, the "common law" furnished,
with few exceptions, ready answers to practically all questions arising in
the conflict of laws. From his statement in the preface, it would appear
that he has been somewhat disillusioned in this regard.
Instead of consisting of a body of fixed rules and principles, the subject
of the conflict of laws is more generally regarded as being still in its in-
fancy and as still groping for stability. And how can it be otherwize, if
we take into consideration the nature of the subject! The rules governing
contracts are today pretty well established, but it has taken many decisions
on the same factual situations to bring about this result. It will not be
until we obtain a similar experience in the field of the conflict of laws we
can hope for a better crystallization of the rules governing particular situa-
tions. Any attempt to state the rules of the conflict of laws in catagorical
form, as is being attempted at present by the American Law Institute,
must in the very nature of things therefore prove to be abortive. If the
rules so laid down should be accepted by the courts as an expression of
sound doctrine, the result, so far as the development of this subject is con-
cerned, is bound to be mischievous, instead of being helpful.
A comparison between the first and second editions of Professor Beale's
casebook shows that the number of eases is about the same. Appromimately
one hundred new cases have been added and a corresponding number of old
cases has been omitted. The total number of pages in the new edition ex-
ceeds that of the first edition by about one hundred pages. With one or
two exceptions the new cases are not annotated. The notes to the old
cases have been retained without change and contain no references there-
fore to the more recent cases and articles dealing with the subject. No
changes have been made either in the selection of foreign cases, so that
they also represent the law as it was at the time of the first edition.
In the arrangement of the material, there has been a radical change.
Professor Beale states the following in this regard in his preface:
"The old arrangement has had no merit except a pedagogical one. Experi-
ence seemed to show that it had that merit; and it may be feared that teach-
ibility has been sacrificed to logic. The new arrangement has not been
adopted because it is more logical, but because it is more in accordance with
that of the restatement of The American Law Institute."
The threefold division into Jurisdiction, the Creation of Rights, and the
Recognition and Enforcement of Rights, which was the characteristic fea-
ture of the first edition, has completely disappeared. Instead we find the
following chapter headings: Law, Jurisdiction over Persons and Things,
Jurisdiction of Courts, Right of Access to Courts, Status, Rights of Prop-
erty, Contracts, Wrongs, Judgments, The Administration of Estates, and
The Determination of Foreign Law.
The first three chapters have the same titles as the corresponding chap-
ters in the first edition. The one on "Law" omits most of the material
formerly included, being reduced from 139 to 27 pages. It contains two
English eases on "renvoi" (In re AnnslcyI and Armitage v. Attorney
General 2), but no -nAerican cases.
The second chapter contains a section on "General Principles of Juris-
diction," which replaces the section entitled "Personal Presence" in the
former edition. In this section the author seeks to develop his general
1 [1926] 1 Ch. 692.
2 [1906] Prob. 135.
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theory concerning the jurisdiction of a state over persons and things. The
jurisdiction of state to tax is dealt with in a special section, as before.
Chapter iv, entitled "Right of Access to Courts," is an innovation, apart
from the section on "Procedure," and the matter of local and transitory
actions, which is dealt with in the first section of this chapter. Sections 2,
3, and 4 of this chapter deal with the non-enforcement of obligations, on
the ground that they are public or penal, or violate some public policy
of the forum. Heretofore these questions were dealt with in the third
volume after the rules governing the creation of rights had been studied.
These cases constitute exceptions to general rules and it seems therefore
anomalous to study them before the rules themselves have been studied.
How can a case like Armstrong v. Best 3 (p. 539) be understood, unless it
is known that the law of the state where the contract is entered into is
ordinarily looked to by the American courts to determine whether a mar-
ried woman had capacity to contract! The capacity of married women to
contract is taken up, however, only on page 278 of the second volume.
The new title of "Status," given to Chapter v, embraces the topics of
marriage, legitimacy, adoption, guardianship of the person, absolute status,
and incorporation. It is difficult to see how this great variety of subjects
can be conveniently or successfully treated together. This "status" of
natural persons is one thing and the "status" of corporations another. The
common element alleged to unite these different topics is their control by
the law of domicil. But we find that marriage is controlled in this country
by the law of the place of celebration rather that that of the domicil of
the parties. In view of this fact, of what value is it to place this topic
under such a general heading as that of "Status?" "Incorporation" is part
of the subject of corporations and is as remote from the other topics of
the general title of "Status," which belong mainly to the law of family, as
could be. The mere fact that the law of the state in which the corporation
was organized is deemed to control in certain respects does not justify
throwing the subject of incorporation into hodge-podge with matters affect-
ing family relations.
The section on "Absolute Status," by which is meant the legal condition
of a person in relation to the community, considers the subjects of slavery,
conviction of crime, attainder, civil death and prodigality, the conclusion
being that all of these, excepting that of slavery, are non-static, that is, that
they have no effect in other states.
Under "Rights of Property," which form the sixth chapter of the new
edition, Professor Beale included in the first edition sections dealing respec-
tively with the nature of property, immovables, movables, trusts and mari-
tal property. The subject of inheritance was treated in an independent
chapter, and the subject of insolvent estates in the chapter on the Admini-
stration of Estates. All of this material is now to be found in one chapter.
As marital rights, rights of inheritance, and assignments for creditors are
controlled by quite different considerations of policy, the question naturally
arises whether anything is to be gained by dealing with them together.
The chapter on "Contracts" is essentially as it was in the former edi-
tion, except that the sections relating to the "effect" of contracts and to
special contracts, such as bills and notes, have been omitted.
The chapter on "Wrongs" includes in the new edition cases on workmen's
compensation, and maritime torts.
ERNEST G. LORENZEN.
3 112 N. C. 59, 17 S. E. 14 (1893).
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Cases on Trial Practice in Ciril Actions. By James Patterson MeBaine.
St. Paul, West Publishing Co., 1927. pp. xvi, 1045.
This is an excellent orthodox casebook. The cases selected cover every
step and proceeding in an action, from the choice of place of trial and issu-
ance of summons to final termination in the trial court They exhibit the
procedure covering defaults, judgment by consent and confession, change of
venue and bills of exception-subjects usually omitted from casebooks.
They present the procedural puzzles which may arise at the various stages
of a law suit, and furnish good examples of the solutions reached by the
courts. They reveal what to do next, how to do it, and how not to do it.
The text and annotations give a very fair picture of the existing law with
a brief indication of its historical development. In short, the book con-
tains full material for teaching the art of practice. But more-its decisions
raise the fundamental problems of procedure and enable the teacher to dis-
cuss not only the art but also the science of practice, or at any rate to
debate -whether there be any such thing as a science of practice or proced-
ure. And a goodly number of helpful references to legal periodical litera-
ture is furnished.
The book is not designed for use by first-year men. It treats practice in
much too great detail for them. Its 368 cases are too many to be discussed
in class in the time usually allotted for such a course. The compiler hesi-
tates to indicate for omission any particular case but thinks that a hurried
teacher might well pass over certain chapters, which will reduce the content
to 315 cases. What seems a more rational though more laborious process is sug-
gested, namely, that each instructor choose what he regards as the key cases
in each section, assign them for study and careful discussion, and use the
balance of the text as a basis for problems which test the application of the
doctrines involved. Could not many casebooks be reduced to usable propor-
tions by the adoption of this suggestion either by the editor originally or by
the instructor using the work?
Dean MeBaine has provided abundant material. What use a teacher will
make of it will depend upon the teacher. One can scarcely censure an
editor if the good tool which he furnishes is clumsily handled by an un-
skilled workman or perversely used by a skilled technician. One can
imagine the former using this tool as a means of imparting mere informa-
tion. Many procedural rules are only mechanical devices for getting Work
done. Any one of half a dozen will serve the purpose quite as well as any
other. The important thing for the practitioner to know is what rule his
jurisdiction has adopted. The reasons for it he may safely leave to aca-
demic speculation. And it is easy to acquire this attitude toward all proce-
dural questions. Or one can readily envisage the technician employing this
material to expound the efficacy of procedural skill as a savior of bad cases.
Many law teachers will recall the exposition which Professor Sunderland's
paper of a few years ago produced at Chicago. An able and distinguished
practitioner of the Illinois bar demonstrated how a combination of skill in
pleading, with a knowledge of and willingness to use the rules of trial and
appellate practice enabled him to collect for his client the tidy sum of
$10,000 to which he was not entitled on the merits. On the other hand,
the teacher who conceives that no procedural rule has any excuse for exist-
ence, save in so far as it aids in the speedy and inexpensive conduct of liti-
gation, will find abundant material for use as horrible examples. He may
complain that he finds too little that points the way to intelligent and in-
telligible reform. And one might well wish that Dean MeBaine had en-
visioned such a system, and by problem cases, if not by actual decisions
had made it difficult for the teacher of procedure to use his book without
at least glimpsing the heavenly vision. EDUND 3L MonGm.
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Private Law Sources and Analogies of International Law. By H. Lauter-
pacht. London, Longmans, Green, & Co., Ltd., 1927. pp. xxiv, 326.
Since the very beginning of modern international law, writers and
publicists have concerned themselves with the problem of to what extent
private law has been a source of international law, and with the question
of the propriety of resorting to analogous legal relations in private law
for the purpose of filling gaps in existing international law. Despite the
obvious importance of the subject, most writers have in the past been
content with large generalizations based upon individual philosophical and
political preconceptions, and until the appearance of Dr. Lauterpacht's
monograph no writer has directed his efforts toward a conscientious ex-
amination not only of legal theory on the subject, but -also of the actual
practice of states. Such a study necessarily involved an analysis of much
original material in the form of decisions of international tribunals, and
this Dr. Lauterpacht has done by specific consideration of the more im-
portant decisions, such as the North Atlantic Coast Fisherics Case, the
Alabama Case, etc., and generalizing on the minor cases.
After demonstrating the great influence which Roman law had upon
the early writers, the writer passes to a criticism of the modern so-called
"positivist" doctrines. Especially enlightening is his discussion of the
influence of political theory in the formulation of the theories of the
"positivists." He points out the fallacy of supposing that any logical or
coherent system of international law can be built upon any rigid concep-
tion of the "sovereignty" of states, or upon any exalted idea of the legal
or moral value of the state which puts the self-interest of the state
above law. The fallacy becomes the more apparent after an examination
of the writings of some of these "positivist" writers, when it is found
that they are forced, as a practical matter, to stop far short of applying
their doctrine to its logical extreme.
No unbiased reader could read through Ralston, The Law and Procedure
of International Tribunals (1926) or Borchard, Diplomatic Protection of
Citizens Abroad (1915) without being convinced of the fact that interna-
tional tribunals have drawn heavily on private law as a source of guiding
principles, and that without such recourse, often legal decisions would,
as a practical matter, be impossible.
We find international tribunals recognizing as applicable in international
law such private law principles as res judicata, prescription, estoppel, etc.,
while private law analogies have been freely resorted to in determining
questions of territorial sovereignty, acquisition and loss of territory, ser-
vitudes, bankruptcy, interest, mandates, leases, measure of damages, burden
of proof, tort responsibility, etc. Private law rules of evidence and
procedure, as well as substantive law are thus included.
Space forbids a discussion of the various decisions analyzed by Dr.
Lauterpacht, but it is perhaps sufficient to say that while many of the
conclusions he draws from individual cases are questionable, he has sot
forth sufficient facts of such nature as to amply support his general
thesis.
There are, of course, limitations upon the resort to private law analogies,
but decisions of international tribunals in the past demonstrate the fact
that such tribunals have been able to properly determine which private law
analogies are applicable in international cases and which are not, and
how far they are to be followed when applicable. Indeed, one cannot but be
impressed with the thought that the influence of private law upon inter-
national law has been an invigorating and strengthening one-it has of-
fered material for the filling of space where there was no law, and when
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so used it has helped to emphasize the essentially legal nature of relations
between states. The rule of force, which has for so long a time governed
the relations of nations, is restricted each time a private law analogy
is applied, and in its place is substituted a known and accepted principle
of law. One of the functions of international law is conceived to be the
gradual substitution of the rule of law for the rule of force in inter-
national relations, and to deny one of the most practicable methods at
hand for realizing that function is to hamper and restrict the expansion
of law in governing the intercourse of nations.
The author fails, in his "conclusions," to note how far this work must
go toward demolishing the rather widespread notion that the so-called
"codification" of international law is a necessary condition precedent to
the proper functioning of an international court. It is not here necessary
to discuss the desirability of codification, or to discuss whether or not
codification is a probable or even possible realization.
Dr. Lauterpacht has demonstrated beyond cavil that international tri-
bunals can and do function without a code of international law, and that
if states were willing to substitute a strictly legal order in international
relations for the present order, existing international tribunals could ef-
fectively determine their legal rights and duties. One is thus led to
suspect that something other than the "codification" of international law
is lacking. One suspects also that the enormous energy expended in the
attempt at complete codification might better be spent in determining and
attempting to remove the really basic causes of the rejection by states
of the complete substitution of law for force.
Occasionally Dr. Lauterpacht gives an unsatisfactory treatment of a
subject, as for example his discussion on Mandates and State Succesion,
but these matters do not detract from the scholarly character of the
work, nor from the general force with which he supports his thesis. Dr.
Lauterpacht possesses and uses what is only too rare among international
law writers-a legal mind. His feet are on the ground, and it is to be
hoped that this monograph will not be his last nor his least contribution
to the subject.
JOHN P. BULLINGTON.
The Origin of State. By Robert H. Lowie. New York, Harcourt, Brace &
Co., 1927. pp. v, 117.
Political scientists and legal historians have to thank Professor Lowie
for bringing together within the scope of this small but significant volume
a mass of ethnological material bearing on the origin and development of
the inclusive political organization which we call the state. It will be
a particularly welcome addition to the library of the man who approaches
the field of government from a sociological point of view.
Inevitably the answer which Professor Lowie finds to the problem re-
garding the origin of the state, is shaped as much by the formulation of
his question as by the results of his investigations. The distinguished
anthropologist frankly takes the evolutionary standpoint, not, of course, that
he is a believer in the long-abandoned doctrine of unilinear development,
but in the sense that his interest is to vindicate the principle of continuity.
From this point of view, the question regarding the origin of the state be-
comes the question whether primitive people are organized in a way which
justifies speaking of their governmental units as "states," or at least as the
rudiments of such.
The reviewer, who belongs to a guild which has probably sinned, more
than any other, against the prescription of sharp definition and consistent
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terminology, should not criticize Professor Lowie too severely for his
omission in this respect. Nevertheless, it is to be regretted that the author
has nowhere given us a clear-cut definition or description of the type of
social organization called the state. What he means by a state is implied
rather than defined. We infer from the treatment of the material, from the
chapter headings, and from his quotations that a state is a social organiza-
tion in which order is maintained within fixed territorial limits by a con-
trolling authority assuming a monopoly of political co6rdination and posses-
sing the power of coercion.
Profe-sor Lowie is frank to admit that such a state has' never existed
among primitive peoples. They do not know a sovereign body with a
controlling authority towering above the individual. Authority is distrib.
uted among different organizations such as churches, local bodies, and
groups of kindred. But is it fair to picture the modern state as territorial
collectivity towering above the individual? Has this concept ever existed
outside the mind of the lawyer? What is characteristic of the modern state
is not that it is the sole authority above the individual, but that it is the
organization possessing special coercive powers because of its legal mon-
opoly of physical force. Even in periods of the greatest absolutism, the
individual has been less aware of his state than of the other collective
groupings in which he has participated. He has undergone its influence,
insofar as he was not a criminal, indirectly, that is through its cordinating
and limiting effect on the associations in which he lives his direct social life,
Due to his interest in continuity, the author emphasizes the similarities
between primitive and modern social organizations, rather than the differ-
ences. His object is not to account for the differences, but to find in prim-
itive social life the elements of state in embryonic form. In the search
for these he is successful.
Among the most primitive peoples such as the Pygmies and the Tas-
manians, the necessary elements of government, leadership and social con-
trol are provided by personal leadership and social disapproval. Among
the slightly more advanced peoples, whose organizations seem at first
glance to be based primarily on blood relationship, and whose subdivisions
are moities and clans, or sibs, the territorial factor is never entirely absent.
Even among the Yurok, the Ifugao, and the Angami people, who at first
sight seem to lack codrdination between the kinship groups, the local bond is
recognized and expressed in the law.
Next to the kinship groups and those based on territorial propinquity,
there are other groupings in primitive life weaving additional threads in
the social pattern and contributing to the process of political integration.
These are the associations, the men's clubs and the secret societies. In
many cases these organizations are the centers of political life, and usually
tend to counterbalance the predominance of the kinship groups. But asso-
ciational activity is not always a means of integration. Competition and
conflict between these associations can be a dissociating and disrupting fac-
tor, a point to which Professor Lowie draws particular attention, as he
feels that in his previous publications he has overstressed the integrating
function of primitive associations.
What we in modern terminology have called "sovereignty," the superiority
of the territorial association over the other groupings within the social
fabric, can also be found in embryonic form in many primitive societies.
The author suggests as a standard of measurement the degree in which
the blood-feud is limited in the interest of the maintenance of order within
the territorial group. In many instances there is definite recognition of
some deeds as crimes, as distinguished from torts or private wrongs. These
acts against the territorial community are sometimes punished by a rudi-
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mentary form of police force such as is found in Africa and among the
Plains Indians.
Having discovered the links he looked for when searching for continuity,
Professor Lowie comes to the conclusion that the germs of political devel-
opment are latent but demonstrable in rudimentary form in primitive
society and, therefore, that some sort of state is a universal feature of
human culture.
To the author, then, the basic problem in considering the origin of the
state is not that of explaining the somersault by which people achieved the
step from government by personal relations to one of territorial contiguity.
The problem is rather to show what factors strengthened the local tie
which must be recognized as a basis for organization, not less ancient than
the kinship tie. Professor Lowie suggests that the answer may lie in the
contact between weaker and stronger groups and the resulting conquest.
If one accepts this formulation of the problem, one can hardly quarrel
with the conclusion. The latter is an inevitable result of the former. But
it appears to the reviewer that Professor Lowie's formulation is not the
only one and his answer, therefore, is not the only answer. The question
regarding origins, that is, regarding the emergence of new forms, cannot
be answered in terms of continuity. Such a formulation of the problem
either leads to inconsistency in terminology or to an answer which is a
contradiction in terms. Consistency of terms is not maintained in the
actual treatment of the problem. The words "origin," "state" and "con-
tinuity" change their meaning. In the formulation of the question the
word "state" is used for a specific type of social organization. In the
answer, "state" denotes social organization in the generic sense, that is,
any kind of social organization. The answer to the question of the origin
of the state, therefore, turns out to be that the state has no origin-it
has always existed. This is nonsense unless the meaning of the word origin
has changed from a concept of occurrence, the factors which brought the
state into existence, to a concept of form, the nature of the primitive state.
A comparable shift in meaning could be illustrated in the field of biology if,
in regard to the origin of a mammalian individual, we used "origin" firt
for the act of propagation and later for the embryo.
To answer a question regarding change in terms of continuity takes all
meaning from the word continuity. This can be made clear in considcring
a more recent example of social change, that of the government in Russia.
It may be pointed out that the functional, vocational associations in which
the predominant authority now rests were existent in embryonic form in
the pre-revolutionary days and that territorial forms still persist. To that
extent, there is continuity. Yet it is hard to deny that the revolutionary
process, which gave these embryonic vocational organizations an absolute
predominance, can scarcely be subsumed under the heading of continuous
processes.
The above methodological considerations suggest that the problem of the
origin of the state has another aspect. It is fundamentally an historical
question and must therefore be defined as such in order to give zcope to
an answer not merely in terms of continuity, but also in terms of dis-con-
tinuity; not only in terms of processes, but also in terms of events. The
problem of the somersault still remains.
Professor'Lowie is not unaware of this other aspect and his book con-
tains the data for an answer to this side of the question. The chapters
referred to are the one dealing with the relation between the size of the
group and the type of organization, and the one dealing with the formation
of classes. In these two chapters the significance of war and conquest
for the transformation of social organization is clearly brought out and ad-
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ditional data are provided, which, according to the reviewer, strengthen
rather than weaken the theories of Gumplowicz and Oppenheimer regarding
the origin of the state. The author and the reviewer, therefore, do not
differ on fundamentals, but on emphasis. Owing to his preoccupation with
the problem of continuity, Professor Lowie, while mentioning war and
conquest, seems to attribute no great significance to these factors. At
least he does not state that they contain the other half of the complete
answer to the question of the origin of the state. It is this over-emphasis
on continuity which detracts slightly from what is otherwise a very valuable
contribution to the borderland between sociology and political science.
NICHOLAS J. SP'YICMAN.
Cases on Partnership and Other Unincorporated Associations. By Scott
Rowley. New York, Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1927. pp. xv, 784.
This book from a publishing house which is a newcomer in the field of law
school casebooks is a great improvement mechanically on many now in use.
The type is large and well spaced, the paper strong and opaque, the bind-
ing durable and the volume of a convenient size and attractive appearance.
Superficially the most evident variation from the conventional is the
almost complete absence of foot-notes. Only law review articles and the
editor's text, The Modern Law of Partnership, are cited. In his preface
the editor expresses the opinion that extensive citations are wasted on
poor students and a source of discouragement to good students because
of the impossibility of reading them all. What footnotes mean to the
law student might well be made a subject of pedagogical research in
some graduate school of education. In the reviewer's experience they
mean much to the instructor. He would like to know whether the case
represents the weight of authority, and how he is to answer the ubiquitous
student who wants to know if this case is law here and now. After
exhausting such cases as the students have had time to prepare the instruc-
tor must somehow fill in the hour with real or apparent variations from
the fact situations involved therein. Citations of recent interesting cases,
editorial notes in law reviews and annotated series of reports are a great
help to the instructor in preparing for his class. Nowadays it is not
necessary to go so far as Ames in collection of comprehensive digests.
In his selection of cases the editor has ignored current decisions citing
and applying the Uniform Partnership Act. Such cases as Giles v. Vette I
and Wharf v. Wharf,2 showing how the Act has changed the law, are
not even noted. It is submitted that an instructor using the book in a
jurisdiction which has adopted the Act should be given some aid in
finding to what extent it has settled conflicting lines of authorities or
changed the law. The Act is printed in the appendix, together with the
English Partnership Act, and the Uniform Limited Partnership Act, with
references to law review articles.
The book is made the more readable by omissions of facts in many
instances, and large portions of opinions. The editor has succeeded in
presenting the more important of the judicial comments on certain problems
of the law of partnership. The omissions of facts in many cases, such as
those involving the existence of partnership as distinguished from some
other relationship, relieve the student of the task, one of the supposed
1263 U. S. 553, 44 Sup. Ct. 157 (1924). See notes (1924) 22 MiC. L. REV.
588 and (1923) 36 HARV. L. Rv. 1016.
2306 fI1. 79, 137 N. E. 446 (1922).
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merits of the casebook system, of analysing the fact situation and discover-
ing just what legal issue the court had to decide.
Half of the main portion of the book which deals with ordinary partner-
ships is devoted to the question of nature and tests of the existence of
the relation. At the outset is a collection of extracts from opinions af-
firming or denying the legal personality of a partnership. This is an
interesting matter, but one of secondary importance to the student. The
primary question is the rule of law applicable to some particular situation.
Legal personality is a device of legal technique used to justify or support
the rule of law found to be applicable. It does not seem useful in the
present state of the law of partnership to discuss legal personality except
in connection with particular rules of law on which it has some bearing.
The student should not be led to conclude that in any particular jurisdiction
a partnership is or is not for all purposes a legal person, or is or is not
treated as such.
'What is partnership property, including good will, is treated adequately.
There seems to be little if any material on the rights of partners in specific
partnership property, the subject matter of Sec. 25 of the Act, as relates
to rights of assignees and separate creditors of partners, and disposition
of realty after dissolution. Fraudulent conveyances and distribution of
insolvent estates as between firm and separate creditors is left for a course
in bankruptcy,--such topics seem to the reviewer more appropriately treated
in a course in partnership.
The later chapters contain several cases on limited partnerships, joint
stock companies and Massachusetts or business trusts. It is dificult to
understand why some Texas cases were printed while the recent drastic
decisions 3 mentioned in the editor's recent law review article were omitted.&4
The publishers assert that the book "can be readily adapted to courses
in Partnership Law or used as collateral reading." How readily it can
be adapted depends upon the method of instruction and the content of
the course instructors desire to offer.
JunsoN A. CnA'N.
Delinquents and Criminals. By William Healy and Augusta Bronner. The
Macmillan Co., 1926. pp. viii, 317.
The chief trouble with most criminologists is that they start their trea-
tises with the assumption that there is a chief trouble which leads to
delinquency. Within the last fifty years we have been told that the one
great cause of crime is anything from cauliflower ear to an inability to
memorize six numbers backwards after one repetition. The one generaliza-
tion a student of the literature can make is that any generalization can be
established as sound by a research worker who starts with that generaliza-
tion as his hypothesis. It is otherwise with a student of facts, and, un-
fortunately for simplicity and catchword propaganda, Dr. Healy and Dr.
Bronner are students of facts.
The material they present is gathered from their individual studies
and follow up of juvenile delinquents in Chicago and Boston. Social
and individual diagnoses are correlated with outcome over about a decade
in order to bring to light causative factors that may be used to predict
and control these outcomes. Past hypothesis to the contrary notwith-
3 Hollister v. McCamey, 115 Tex. 49, 274 S. W. 562 (1925) ; Thompson v.
Schmitt, 115 Tex. 53, 274 S. W. 554 (1925); Victor Refining Co. v. City
Nat. Bank of Commerce, 115 Tex. 71, 274 S. W. 261 (1925); Howe v.
Keystone Pipe & Supply Co., 115 Tex. 15S 274 S. W. 563 (1925).
4 Rowley, Te Influence of Control in tic Dctermination of Partalci-rsp
Liability (1928) 26 MICH. L. REv. 290.
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standing, these investigators find that heredity, nationality, poverty (ex-
cept in extreme, and therefore rare cases), physical type, bad habit (such
as excessive smoking, masturbation, etc.) are of no appreciable assistance
when taken alone as a basis for prognosis. The mentally abnormal have
a smaller percentage of successful outcomes than the mentally normal,
but the difference is not great, while the number of abnormal delinquents
in the whole group is almost as abnormally small as the normal curve
of distribution would lead one to expect in the general population.
There are some positive causative factors which may, in individual cases,
lead to crime. They are such things as mental conflicts, bad companions,
social suggestibility, early sex experiences. They are not postulated as
general causes of crime, because the experiences are almost universal;
but in any given case one or more of these factors (including, of course,
those mentioned in the previous paragraph) may appear as the outstanding
cause of a delinquent career. Whether or not any factor does so appear
depends not upon a general theory, but upon a careful, individual study.
The effect of a community upon delinquency is well brought out by a
comparison of the Chicago and Boston cases. In the former city over
half of those studied continued their careers of crime, while in the latter
only a little more than a quarter of the outcomes were unsuccessful. There
are many possible explanations, on one of which the authors of the present
volume lay some stress; that is the tendency, in Chicago, to send the boy
or girl in trouble to a juvenile institution against the much wider use,
in Boston, of probation and placing out. In both cities the institution
handled cases were less successful than those handled outside.
All this smashing of precedent is as important as any work a crim-
inologist can undertake at the present moment. A complete dissociation
of ideas must precede any constructive study that is to transcend the nar-
row conceptual limits set by tradition. Since one must approach any re-
search with some psychological limitation imposed by his past experience,
it is desirable that that experince include some such general denial of
everyone else's past experience as the present volume.
DoNALD SLESINGER.
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